Kineman, J. 1997. Theory of Autevolution
CONCLUSIONS
In this paper I have examined the roots of an autevolutionary
worldview by drawing inferences from currently phenomenalistic
concepts of Gaia, outlining epistemological arguments, and making
interdisciplinary comparisons. Whether or not this view will prove
to be fruitful (one of the epistemological criteria for worldviews),
is yet to be determined. However, toward this end, some reasonable
avenues for development seem to exist. Some conclusions from this
investigation are:
- New worldview
Theory of Autevolution
Implications for science
Form-function complimentarity
Punctuated equilibrium model
Importance of perception and psychology
Classical and non-classical evolution
Theoretical constraints
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New worldview
The circle of ideas identified in the Chapman conference as “strong
Gaia” are best treated in the context of a new worldview,
as they do not fit epistemologically as an hypothesis (“the
Gaia hypothesis”) within current ecological and evolutionary
worldviews. A non-deterministic quantum physical worldview, suggested
by Bohr, Wheeler, Schroedinger, and others, following closely
the Copenhagen interpretation of quantum phenomena, provides a
suitable model to support formulation of self-definition as a
central theme in systems organization. This worldview is scientific,
according to precise criteria described here, and it is in current
practice, although not as yet formally applied to biological disciplines.
Furthermore, evidence now exists that the defining phenomenon
for this worldview, observership, can be exhibited within macroscopic
systems and probably exists in at least some biological structures.
If these propositions are confirmed, it implies that observership
can be and has been acted on by natural selection, perhaps offering
a reasonable explanation for evolution of various forms of self
experience. These ideas are offered to support adoption of a worldview
where life is a fundamentally creative process that can affect
its own evolution. It is proposed that this view be called autevolution.
Theory of Autevolution
The final test of a worldview is its ability to spawn fruitful
theory. A theory of autevolution is thus suggested in special
and general form based on the principle that life is a fundamentally
self-experiencing (deriving from observership), non-deterministic,
and causally active process in evolution. The special case
may be defined as the evolution of the self (self-experience)
and the role of the self-definition in evolution of organisms
and species. The general case may be defined as the extension
of the special case to inter-specific interactions, to systems,
and to societies.
Implications for science
Theory resulting from an autevolutionary view should pose no threat
to science in general, or to prior theories except to purpose
that those theories have limits (which any sound epistemology
should expect). It is clear that autevolution would be a theoretical
pursuit that must develop its own formalism and that its implications
are interdisciplinary. Furthermore, any attempt to develop theory
within this worldview will require epistemological synthesis.
In presenting both a descriptive and normative model for epistemological
synthesis in this paper, I suggest that science as a means of
acquiring knowledge may be a natural process itself, and thus
may be exemplified in the natural world (Roederer, 1978;
Jantsch, 1980; Goldberg, 1989).
Form-function complimentarity
A possible causal process (“mechanism”) for the special
theory is proposed in terms of form-function complimentarity over
evolutionary time, with the medium of inheritance of functional
decisions being behavioral modification or selection of the environment,
which in turn selects form, which in turn constrains function
(to uncertainty limits). In the autevolution view, living organisms
are not so much “struggling for survival” as they are
modifying and fulfilling function, and in so doing, acquiring
knowledge, which is incorporated into their structure through
their effect on natural selection – a truly participatory process.
Organizational tendencies may then result from self-determination
and can be enhanced at the organismic level (through positive
selective evolutionary feedback), eventually extending to larger
systems through mutual feedbacks between organisms. An evolutionary
complementarity between form and function is proposed here, which
ensures that genetic determinism would have important fundamental
limits. Within the uncertainty range of such indeterminism, free-will
(or intention) may operate. The result of non-deterministic behavioral
choice would be a feedback of information from organism to genome,
mediated by modifications of the environment and life strategy
(and thus selection), affecting other generations and other species.
In such a process the evolution of form and the expression of
function (behavior) can never perfectly correspond, and the mismatch
must then modify and influence the evolution of form along pathways
that are determined in part by organismic perception (of environment
and self-function, or purpose). Non-random and seemingly purposeful
evolutionary pathways, not solely predictable from the effect
of environmental forces, would be the expected result, rather
than the enigma it seems to be in current biological worldviews.
Punctuated equilibrium model
It is suggested that given this process, the basic model presented
in Figure 1 for the growth of intellectual
knowledge through scientific discovery, may also be applied as
a model for the evolution of species, complex organisms, communities,
and ecosystems, with the tendency toward punctuated phenomena
being axiomatic. If organismic life can be a causative agent (i.e.
source of novelty) in its own evolution, then perception of
information and definition of purpose may be a determining force
for evolutionary pathways, in nature as in our human practice
of scientific discovery (which then may also be thought of as
natural).
Importance of perception and psychology
Theories within the Gaia framework, like other macroevolution
theories, may describe processes than are not dealt with adequately
in current biology and geoscience traditions. Because they attempt
to be holistic in their consideration of ecological and evolutionary
time, and because of the critical, causal role that observer-participancy
may have in autevolution and thus in forming a strong Gaia theory,
greater importance would be placed on theories of perception
and psychology applied to all living forms (e.g., Abram, 1985),
the role of behavior in directing evolution (Plotkin, 1988),
an epistemology which allows theory formally to include fundamental
(ontic) uncertainties instead of only experimental unknowns (Rohrlich, 1989),
and certain kinds of teleology (George and Johnson, 1985).
This would incorporate a new assumption into evolution theory
by allowing novelty in ecological time to influence environmental
selection, with significant implications for directionality in
evolutionary pathways, coevolution, and cooperation theory at
all levels (Corning, 1983;
Axelrod, 1984; Odling-Smee, 1988;
Lovelock, 1988).
Classical and non-classical evolution
It is implied by the opinions expressed here that we must pursue
current classical views of ecology and evolution (i.e., the present
norm), but not as a dogmatic limit to biological investigation.
Rather it must be pursued as a useful first-order mechanical
approximation to reality, which we know is more complex, with
important processes extending beyond the classical realm of space
and time dimensions. Quantum physical processes (observer-participancy)
expressed macroscopically and magnified over time by the operation
of mechanical (classical) evolutionary process, may account for
the emergence of self-determination as a significant second-order
factor in evolution and ecology. In this view, self-determination
properties of systems (Gaia), if they are in fact organized at
that level (which would require structures or coordination mechanisms
for sub-structures capable of maintaining such phenomena), stem
from self-determination of organismic function, which would appear
objectively as indeterminism. Furthermore, these phenomena
cannot be uniquely isolated to the human example, but must rather
be recognized as a property of all living organisms (and perhaps
all matter) expressed variably at different levels of complexity.
This view might imply evolutionary tendencies toward large-scale
coevolution and cooperation as a function of the degree of expression
and interdependence of teleonomic indeterminism (free-will determinations
of function and, by implication, purpose) originating with the
phenotype. This may present intriguing possibilities for the development
of interdisciplinary ecological and evolutionary models that take
into account the evolutionary feedback of functional modifications
and their collective effect on environmental selection (i.e.,
complementarity of form and function through evolutionary time).
It seems possible that some of the emergent properties of living
systems attributed to Gaia may be derivable from such an approach.
At the very least we might suspect that the human equation, including
our relationship with earth systems and our own evolution, may
be an important example.
Theoretical constraints
Limitations of the proposed theory may be severe, even though
it seems attractive from the perspective of meeting a “creative”
worldview, such as implied in concepts of Gaia. The most basic
limitation is acceptance of non-determinism. This choice is forced
upon us in both physics and psychology, but is ultimately metaphysical,
and must be evaluated by the criteria described for worldviews.
The idea that non-determinism (observership) can be magnified
within macroscopic biological structures, though indicated by
some current evidence, remains to be well demonstrated in the
appropriate context. That this strange property is intimately
associated with the existence of an experiential “self”
is inferred from analogy between quantum phenomena and psychology,
and a direct connection may not be provable any more than it is
possible to prove by means other than analogy, except for ourselves,
that people have experience. Acceptance here must be based on
the lack of acceptable alternatives. However, given such a worldview
that adopts the foregoing or equivalent assumptions about the
origins of experience and the primitive origins of thought and
psyche (not to be interpreted strictly in human terms), the application
of evolutionary principles leads fairly directly to the idea of
complimentarity between form and self-definition or self-defined
function. This is based on the logical primacy of the thought
“I am” which, when combined with uncertainty, produces
the next thought “Am I?” or “I am what?,”
or “I am {a, b, …, etc.}” Ability to express uncertainty
and definitions in a form that can be subject to natural selection
(causal link between psyche and physical expression), is axiomatic
(given the relationship between observership and form), however
the degree to which this process is constrained or influenced
by genetic, developmental, and various other environmental factors
must be determined for each case. The medium of inheritance is
suggested as environmental change or selection of environmental
factors by organismic behavior. The process of writing and means
for reading such information from one’s surroundings must be described
and demonstrated, yet must involve a high degree of speculation
regarding species other than our own.
These conclusions necessarily involve psychological and metaphysical
theories, and perhaps also theories of logic and information.
The linkage to human psychological phenomena is presumed from
evolutionary arguments (i.e., present abilities evolving from
primitive origins). Although arguments were given that autevolution
cannot be rejected on epistemological grounds, the fruitfulness
of this view depends on success of its corresponding theories.
Aside from the many issues mentioned above, the task of isolating
biological structures capable of exhibiting observership phenomena
may perhaps be the most critical challenge in establishing a causal
process. Alternative theories of innovation and self-awareness
emerging from complexity may remain unconvincing in a deterministic
paradigm.
Finally, one must retain perspective in evaluating the implications
of self-determination in evolution. I have proposed autevolution
as a useful second-order effect on the overall process of evolution.
This does not invalidate the first-order effects that have previously
been described as largely mechanical and deterministic at the
phenotype level (i.e., the modern Darwinian synthesis), nor the
amazing complexities of living organisms that are adequately attributed
to primarily mechanical processes (convergent and divergent evolution
due respectively to similar and dissimilar environments, kin selection,
effects of randomly fortuitous genetic variations, mutations,
and recombination, etc.). However, even the slightest effect from
complexification (or magnification) of observer-participancy could
introduce directionality in an otherwise mechanical, and neutral
process. The effect need not be dominant to produce directional
trends, as evolution can greatly magnify subtleties that are adaptive.
The effect may (or must) presumably have begun in an infinitesimal
form (e.g., at the sub-atomic level, as suggested here), and could
have been subjected to selection only by those systems capable
of magnifying it (suggested here and elsewhere as a property of
some dissipative structures). It may thus be more difficult to
imagine at the present time how evolution might not have been
affected by such a process than how it would be; yet the degree
of influence must be determined for each case. The existence of
structures (quantum coherence exhibiting observer-participancy
phenomena) necessary to allow a self-determination process to
be expressed macroscopically (i.e., in living organisms) is essential
to the theory, but has been demonstrated only in principle and
by inference from human experience and observed similarities of
behavior in other organisms. Further extension of these ideas
to all life can only be based on the reasonableness and fruitfulness
of the worldview, as we may never have the ability to directly
share the experience of other organisms. Still, full application
of this view even to the human case may have profound implications.
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Reprinted from: Kineman, John Jay. 1991. “Gaia: Hypothesis
or worldview?” Chapter 7 In: Schneider, S. H., and P. J.
Boston (eds). 1991. Scientists on Gaia. Papers delivered
at the American Geophysical Union’s annual Chapman Conference
in March, 1988. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 433p.
Please cite as: Kineman, John Jay. 1997. “Toward a special
and general theory of autevolution.” Boulder: Bear Mountain
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