Kineman, J. 1997. Theory of Autevolution
Discussion I:
Teleology and the origin of novelty
In the preceding sections I attempted to establish both a worldview
context for autevolution (as a strong basis for Gaia), and an
epistemological framework for evaluating paradigms. In this and
the following section I consider some of the more problematic
implications and some potential conflicts with existing theory,
beginning with problems of teleology and the origin of novelty.
In the next section, I expand this discussion to develop evolutionary
aspects of autevolution.
- The necessity of purpose
- Formal treatments of teleology
- Teleology and survival
- Novelty at the phenotypic level
- Disciplinary compartmentalization
- Formal treatments of teleology
The necessity of purpose
The view of life as a causal agent introduces a major issue in
epistemology: This is the issue of teleology (i.e., purpose or
goal directedness). When studying physics, it is possible to define
a quantity called “observer-participancy” or “registration”
(Wheeler, 1981) and to
treat it as a random factor (uncertainty). Because this quantity
takes on the role of decision-maker in the physical experiments,
the physics itself (aside from hidden variables theories) does
not have to deal with how or why decisions are made (e.g., what
causes the observer to measure a quantum system, or correspondingly,
what causes individual registration events?). However, in a
formal theory about the decision-maker (i.e. life in autevolutionary
terms) the question of purpose seems inescapable. Bohr (1958),
for example, stated flatly that teleology (although perhaps not
the cosmic teleology of Kant) must, because of the quantum discoveries,
be a part of biology.
Formal treatments of teleology
There are recent formal treatments of teleology (George and Johnson, 1985);
and while the debate continues, teleological explanations are
no longer considered “automatic evidence of sloppy thinking.”
Specific theories are emerging on how it can be treated scientifically
(e.g., in cybernetics). Mayr (1988)
distinguishes between “teleomatic” processes,
defined as progression toward an end state through physical processes
(i.e., inevitable change in a predictable direction, such as the
Hubble expansion of the universe or the second law of thermodynamics),
and “teleonomic” processes, which are those that
are guided by a program (defined by Mayr as coded information
controlling an end-directed process). Teleonomic processes, including
those adapted through natural selection, can incorporate new information
to alter the outcome, but apparently not the program itself, which
is the result of natural selection. Mayr excludes “cosmic”
teleology, that is, a “causally effective end result,”
from acceptable science, stating boldly that: “Indeed,
I do not know of a single modern scientist who believes in it.”
Although in Mayr’s words teleonomy is “perhaps the most
characteristic feature of the world of living organisms,”
it seems to be viewed strictly as a system-dependent process,
not a general principle. This allows its application in ecology
and organismic biology (e.g., migration, courtship, ontogeny,
and numerous other goal-directed processes) but prevents its application
in evolution theory (which would generalize it to cosmic dimensions).
Mayr, reflecting the traditional worldview, states: “It
is illegitimate to describe evolutionary progress or trends as
goal directed (teleological). Selection rewards past phenomena
… but does not plan for the future.” Biologists thus
generally deny any form of evolutionary “progress” that
might be motivated by a goal, or imply “final cause”
(Futuyma, 1979). Trends
in evolution, then, must be due to either chance occurrences,
(e.g., disturbance, migration, environmental change, and so forth)
or teleomatic end results (e.g., adaptation, niche segregation,
optimization, and others).
Teleology and survival
However, within ecology and organismic biology, organisms are
treated as if they were active agents, responding to and modifying
their environment during the course of their life spans, in ways
that promote survival. Here, the distinction between survival
as a goal (cosmic teleology) and survival as an existential (and
thus teleomatic) result of natural selection is somewhat obscure;
but it is nevertheless maintained by the circular argument that
good survival strategies (coded in the genes of fit survivors)
have been selected for but cannot include a plan or vision for
an ultimate state (such as long-term survival) because a future
state could not have been a selective factor in ecological time.
Thus, evolution theory has been used to establish survival
as the paradigm for ecology, while excluding it or anything else
as an evolutionarily effective goal within organismic behavior.
It follows that teleonomic behavior should only evolve to benefit
survival of kin and reproductive offspring in ecological time
(thus implying great importance for competition, since only the
survival “programs” represented in related genes can
be reinforced).
Novelty at the phenotypic level
These traditional theories of evolution have also excluded consideration
of true novelty at the phenotypic or ecological level, for if
behavioral novelties (i.e. not the result of selection) could
also promote survival, then it would be impossible to distinguish
this from final cause. Furthermore, the concepts of behavioral
novelty and a teleonomy that can include a vision or goal of abstract
states approach the concept of mind or psyche (although not necessarily
in the human sense), and the comparison is unavoidable. Thus in
order to deny final cause, the tendency is also to exclude concepts
of mind.
This attempt to avoid the problem of final cause by the selective
exclusion from evolution theory of principles that might introduce
teleology, has resulted in an unrealistic separation of disciplines
and timescales and, not surprisingly, some controversy. Odling-Smee (1988),
citing B.C. Patten, for example, claims that the Modern Synthesis
“leads us directly to the separation of organisms from
their environments.” He further states that:
…[the modern synthesis] “cannot model environmental
changes in terms of anything at all… the synthetic theory lacks
any medium of inheritance that could allow it to describe environmental
changes as an integral part of the evolutionary process. Instead
it is forced to assume that the environment is autonomous and
that environmental change is a separate matter from changing organisms.
The result is two disciplines: ecology, which handles environmental
change, and evolutionary biology, which deals with changing organisms
. . . Hence the Modern Synthesis has to rule out the possibility
that the outputs of active organisms are capable of modifying
their own subsequent inputs in evolutionarily significant ways.”
According to Odling-Smee, this paradox was first pointed out by
the physicist, Schrödinger (famous for the Schrödinger
wave equation of quantum physics).
The common view in adaptation and evolution theories is that novelty
(including survival strategy) originates in genetic variation,
which is then selected by an independent environment. Because
genes are the medium of inheritance, not phenotypes, all the phenotypic
processes intervening between generations (i.e., everything the
organism does) tend to be treated as merely the mechanism of interaction
between the genotype and natural selection, but not itself a source
of novelty. This view may owe much of its basis to the rejection
of Lamarckism (which held, incorrectly, that a process of phenotypic
novelty affecting evolution could operate through direct heredity);
but it seems to be untenable if one considers that novel behavior
can alter the evolutionary pathway in indirect ways. Yet behavior
is typically reduced to a sophistication of genetic programming,
and therefore a pre-selected result that cannot introduce novelty
in ecological time.
It then follows that the organism is viewed as a passive agent
acted upon by the total environment (which is virtually undefinable,
yet assumed to include the influence of living organisms), ignoring
autogenic effects (i.e. influences from the one organism that
is always present). This is directly analogous to the Newtonian
or atomistic worldview in which passive objects are “forced”
externally. The opportunity for organisms to influence their own
selection through behavioral novelty (Plotkin, 1988),
and subsequently influence evolutionary pathways (Jantsch, 1980),
is thus excluded from current evolution theory by the way it has
been formalized.
Disciplinary compartmentalization
The division of disciplines thus preserves the contradiction of,
on the one hand, a passive or random biological model for evolutionary
novelty, and on the other, evidence of creativity in life strategies,
decision-making, and our own (human) experience of choice. Perhaps
by this division we are able to formulate useful first order theories
that describe certain aspects of living organisms, however the
arbitrary separation also insures that some second order system
properties will be ignored. For example, if such unrealistic limitations
of traditional theory are relaxed, the concept of internal causal
processes influencing behavior and life strategies may be integrated
with models for external environmental effects and interactions
with other species, including feedbacks over both ecological and
evolutionary time scales.
Revised and reprinted from: Kineman, John Jay. 1991. “Gaia:
hypothesis or worldview?” Paper delivered at the American
Geophysical Union annual Chapman Conference, panel on epistemology,
March, 1988, San Diego, California. Chapter 7 In: Schneider, S.
H., and P. J. Boston (eds). 1991. Scientists on Gaia. Cambridge,
MA: MIT Press. 433p.
Please cite as: Kineman, John Jay. 1997. “Toward a special
and general theory of autevolution.” Boulder: Bear Mountain
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