Kineman, J. 1997. Theory of Autevolution
Foreword
- About the first and second edition
The evolution controversy: mechanical vs. organicCautious revolutions
Advances in Physics and the nature of consciousnessConsistency with current theories
Toward a special and general theory of autevolutionQuantum reality — is the “many worlds” interpretation reasonable?
The Cat Paradox
Why must autevolution be consistent with existing models?Is autevolution reductionistic?
Is autevolution vitalistic?
What is art?
About the first and second edition
The original versionof this paper was presented in 1988 in San Diego at the annualAGU Chapman Conference, on which occasion the topic was JamesLovelock’s Gaia hypothesis. I was on the epistemology panel andattempted to defend the stronger view of Gaia, which the majorityof the conference was inclined to dismiss. I was very gratefulfor David Abram, who provided an eloquent defense (on a differentbasis) at a time when my ideas were only partially formed. AsI struggled over the next three years to finish the paper, I alsoencouraged David to complete his, as we both experienced heavyfire from the reviewers. I was quite pleased when both papersappeared in the book “Scientists on Gaia” editedby Stephen H. Schneider and Penelope J. Boston, and publishedby MIT Press in 1991. However, that book is now out of print,and very little discussion has resulted on these ideas.I have kept much of the original material, except for editorialchanges, the addition of this foreword, more detail in the conclusionsection, and correction of an omission in the list of criteriain the epistemology section. Editorial changes included the relabellingof terms used in the conference for more general application,and, most significantly, identifying the metaphysical backboneof the stronger view of self-determination (in organisms and systems)as a special and general theory of autevolution.
Return to menuThe evolution controversy: mechanical vs. organicI conclude from recent publications that the discussion of mechanicalvs. organic evolution (see Abram, 1991)is still very active. A recent article in Earth magazineby Niles Eldredge, for example, discusses the question of “Whatdrives evolution” and cites a long and continuing debatebetween paleontologists and geneticists, one arguing for environmentaldriving forces, the other for internal genetic determinants. Italso mentions the problem of “stasis” in the evolutionof organisms and ecosystems (Gould’s punctuated equilibrium),which is a problem for both theories that would otherwise predictmore continual change, either from genetic or environmental changes.Both of these views are mechanical, which a growing body of literatureseriously questions as an exclusive perspective.The thesis I present here on autevolution proposes thatthere is an organic process that could also contribute to punctuatedstability, as well as apparent directions in evolutionary pathways,self-determining properties of living systems that are fundamentalto stronger forms of Gaia theory, and many other apparent paradoxesin our current understanding of the origins and evolution of life.I have concluded that representing this factor rigorously in bothecology and evolution theory, however, requires a formal recognitionof life itself as a creative property within all organisms, andrequires an explanation of its evolution from primitive origins.Similar “vitalistic” ideas have been proposed beforein various forms, but these were largely unconvincing in theirattempts (if any) to identify a causal process or useful modelfor how creativity is generated. As a result these historicalviews have failed to free themselves from the limits of mechanicalprocesses that otherwise are assumed to explain all that we see.The mechanical view is particularly pernicious because proponentstend to separate phenomena into two prejudicial classes, thosethings that are explained mechanically, and those things thathave not yet been explained. The obvious third category is oftenpresumed to be non-science. Some views suggest that creativitycan be an “emergent property” of complex systems, eventhough those systems are basically mechanical. In my opinion,this view ultimately fails without a more elemental non-mechanical(i.e., non-deterministic) basis. The matter of determinism vs.non-determinism is hotly debated with regard to consciousness.If taken to their logical extreme, mechanical views must eventuallyconclude that any emergence of creative experience would necessarilybe an illusion, perhaps sufficiently unpredictable to give thefeeling of free will, but also essentially deterministic and thusthe effect of other processes but not itself causal. This meansthat not only are all of our actions determined (although notin an obvious way to us), but also our experience of decidingto perform those actions, debate alternatives, agree, rebel, andso on, is also predetermined; and if knowing this informationprompts anyone to reverse those decisions in an attempt to disprovedeterminism, the fact that this information would be written andbecome known, and that consequential changes would then be made,and precisely what those changes would be, was also determined,etc. This ultimately fatalistic view is a logical deterministictrap that is analogous to a computer program getting stuck inan infinite loop, but it is extremely hard to argue out of thison any basis other than one’s own intuition and experience.I believe that one epistemological criteria may be invoked herethat may be surprising in this context – that of parsimony.Determinists generally assume that parsimony is in their favor,but the argument is simply that the deterministic chain of explanationsis infinitely long, with a new supposition added to match everyunpredicted thought. Even if one wants to believe this is whatis really happening, it is not the simplest and best way to describeit for understanding and predictive purposes, which is the goalof scientific parsimony. Even if prediction has fundamental limits(as a non-deterministic worldview predicts), that is better thanexplanations that are entirely post-hoc and untestable due totheir infinitely long chain of assumptions. Thus, while one mayassume a very complex set of causes influencing organismic function(and behavior), we must assume on the basis of experience (atleast for more complex organisms) that more than one outcome ispossible from a given set of deterministic conditions (no matterhow precisely defined), and that a participatory “self”is involved in making the choice. To assume otherwise is to eitherdeny human experience (obviously unproductive, since the ultimategoal of science is to understand human experience), or to ascribeall experience to pure randomness (again a denial of experientialevidence). This conclusion does not require, however, that theset of possible choices be infinite. In some cosmic sense allpossible experience may be pre-determined and free will may actuallybe a matter of selecting from this set (as some beliefs hold),but that is a much farther removed problem than the one at hand.An even more parsimonious theory for the complex phenomena ofpsyche can be arrived at by seeking an evolutionary basis forcreative process within fundamental aspects of nature. It is certainlyno less valid to assume that psyche evolved from primitive originsthan to assume (without evidence) that it emerged suddenly andmysteriously as a non-deterministic process from a critical stageof deterministic complexity (which is most often assumed). TheDarwinian model established the concept of incremental evolutionfor biological form against strong prejudice, and I suggest thatthe same situation now exists for the evolution of psyche. Thinkingin terms of incremental evolution, the seemingly emergent propertyassociated with true novelty must instead be sought in a fundamentalproperty of nature that has been acted upon by natural selectionin a similar manner to the evolution of physical form. It thenfollows that more primative forms of psyche exist in all organisms.The organic view may also allow an extension of concepts fromthe Odum school of systems ecology. It has come to be acceptedthat certain system properties seem to be “more than thesum of their parts,” giving rise to the concept of “emergentproperties.” While this may be a useful assumption at theecological level, the previous arguments suggest that the parts(in this case the evolutionary building blocks of psyche), musthave contained certain eventually emergent aspects of the whole.In this way, the fundamental wholeness of nature (strongly impliedcosmologically, quantum physically, and as I argue, psychologically)is conserved within every aspect that has distilled from thatwhole. Such properties could indeed be both cause and caused,depending on the perspective from which it is viewed (a sort ofevolutionary bootstrapping).In searching out these ideas regarding a fundamental evolutionarybasis for modeling creativity and psyche, one can find such abasis in the biological evolution of quantum properties of matter.
Return to menuCautious revolutionsAfter publishing in 1991 I have been somewhat reserved about promotingthese ideas because they imply significant modifications to currentevolution and other theory (and scientific worldviews), and becausethey argue from a philosophical and metaphysical basis that mayseem reminiscent of the vitalistic metaphysics that evolutiontheory had to be initially rescued from. However, it is preciselyin these mental disciplines (within which we could include mathematics)that we must look for guidance on new perspectives, when the oldones have exhausted their usefulness. This fact came to be appreciatedby two well known philosophers, Thomas Kuhn, in terms of “paradigms”and “worldviews,” and Carl Popper, in terms of “metaphysicalresearch programs,” which were seen as foundational to allscience and the essence of scientific revolutions. A return tometaphysical inquiry is not a return to pre-Darwinian metaphysics,but an attempt to the next important step, one that could notproperly be envisioned prior to having a solid theoretical framework.One must be cautious to avoid over-using the philosophy of scientificrevolutions as an excuse to invent fanciful explanations thathave little productive value in science. Scientists are generallynot ignorant of alternative views, nor are many of them insensitiveto the potential value of alternative views as “true”constructs within various disciplines or practices (scientificor not). Most philosophers of science have concluded (often laterin life) that there may be no absolutely true perspective fromthe human frame of reference — that what is true of nature isgenerally beyond the reach of human perception, including ourbest scientific models and theories. Nevertheless, it is extremelyuseful to us, bound as we are by our perception, to constructbetter and better approximations to reality that have predictiveand explanatory value. By profession we are trained to use cautionand proceed methodically, so that a body of consistent knowledgecan be built with the minimum of wasted time. This has as muchto do with what we, as a scientific profession and as a society,are capable of understanding as it does with the true nature ofreality. Hence, steps such as I attempt here must be taken withutmost care. I have attempted to refine this to the best of myability over the course of about a decade, and I have only recentlybecome willing to promote these views more widely because of thevalue I see in them for both science and society.
Return to menuAdvances in Physics and the nature of consciousnessIn preparing this forward and revision of terms in the paper,I again visited some of the recent literature. I was particularlystruck by philosophical developments in evolutionary cybernetics,and the lack of similar developments in the primary life sciences.It seems that scientists attempting to create life in a computerare, perhaps understandably, more concerned with the fundamentalquestions of what life really is than people dedicated to studyingit’s present forms. In this regard the television character “CommanderData” (in the recent Star Trek The Next Generation series),may have been a quite prophetic invention — the android who revealsmore about humanity than the human characters, simply becausehe is attempting to emulate them.As is now popularly known, physicists also have stumbled intothese fundamental questions of life because of their discoveryof uncomfortable limits to classical physics theory that seemto involve phenomena normally associated with life and particularlywith psychology and perception. Correspondingly, my decision tobetter focus and republish these ideas was stimulated by a recentlyannounced success in laboratory physics that seems to supportthe quantum-indeterminacy view which I suggested should be incorporatedinto models of evolution. In my home town, Boulder, Colorado,physicists have succeeded in creating a “Bose-Einstein”condensate under laboratory conditions. This is a quantum correlatedstate of matter existing at macroscopic dimensions (high quantumnumbers), a theoretical possibility imagined by the early quantumresearchers thinking about possible mechanisms for consciousness.At that time, however, it was not producible under laboratoryconditions. These events demonstrate two important things: First,that macroscopic quantum behavior is possible; and second thatsuch behavior is limited to special arrangements of matter.The existence of Bose-Einstein states seems to demonstrate thatmacroscopic quantum uncertainty is a real phenomenon, at leastfrom the perspective of our perceptual world. It has also beensuggested that it is a good model for the basis of perceptionand some form of proto-consciousness. This was a point I arguedfor in the paper, based on my earlier literature study on thequantum nature of biological sensory systems, particularly hearingand sight. It is by no means demonstrated, of course, that theseastounding discoveries reveal a sufficient basis for perceptionand consciousness (along with all of the intricacies of psychology,culture, etc); but they do appear to be laying an essential foundationthat could very well lead in that direction. Although the actualstructure must obviously be different from that used in the laboratory,the fundamental issue of “magnification” of quantumbehavior (credited to Niels Bohr in my paper) may now be an issueof how and where, and not so much if.In fact there is now serious work being done to demonstrate thebasis for consciousness in correlated matter (Bose-Einstein statesof matter) existing in biological structures within neurons. Hameroff and Penrose (1996a)claim in a recent paper that it is likely that such a basis existsin neuronal cells (please see the original paperfor the embedded references). Quoting from that paper:Features of consciousness difficult to understand in terms of conventional neuroscience have evoked application of quantum theory, which describes the fundamental behavior of matter and energy. In this paper we propose that aspects of quantum theory (e.g. quantum coherence) and of a newly proposed physical phenomenon of quantum wave function “self-collapse” (objective reduction: OR -Penrose, 1994) are essential for consciousness, and occur in cytoskeletal microtubules and other structures within each of the brain’s neurons……Where and how in the brain can quantum effects occur? Warm, wet and noisy, the brain at first glance seems a hostile environment for delicate quantum phenomena which generally demand isolation and cold stillness (superconductors), or energy pumping of crystals (lasers). Nonetheless, various authors have implicated ion channels, ions themselves, DNA, pre-synaptic grids and cytoskeletal microtubules as somehow mediating “standard” quantum effects. In a dualist context, Beck and Eccles (1992) proposed that an external ”conscious self” might influence the apparently random quantum effects acting on neurotransmitter release at the pre-synaptic grid within each neural axon. Stapp (1993) has suggested that (SR) wave function collapse in neurons is closely related to consciousness in the brain. In our view, cytoskeletal microtubules are the most likely sites for quantum coherence, OR and consciousness.On the subject of “self-collapse” – analogous to the”decision event” referred to in my paper, Hameroff andPenrose also state:Consciousness, it is argued, requires non-computability (Penrose, 1989; 1994). In standard quantum theory there is no non-computable activity, the R process being totally random. The only readily available apparent source of non-computability is OR (and Orch OR) self-collapse. An essential feature of consciousness might then be a large-scale quantum-coherent state maintained for a considerable time. OR (Orch OR) then takes place because of a sufficient mass displacement in this state, so that it indulges in a self-collapse which somehow influences or controls brain function. Microtubules seem to provide easily the most promising place for these requirements.The following is a sketch of a neuron, showing the microtubules:
Figure 1. Schematic of central region of neuron (distal axon and dendrites not shown) showing parallel arrayed microtubules interconnected by MAPs. Microtubules in axons are lengthy and continuous, whereas in dendrites they are interrupted and of mixed polarity. Linking proteins connect microtubules to membrane proteins including receptors on dendritic spines. (From Hameroff and Penrose, 1996a)Hameroff and Penrose (1996b)provide a good history of these ideas in the introduction to anotherrecent paper (please see the original paperfor the embedded references):The “hard problem” of incorporating the phenomenon of consciousness into a scientific world-view involves finding scientific explanations of qualia, or the subjective experience of mental states (Chalmers, 1995; 1996). On this, reductionist science is still at sea. Why do we have an inner life, and what exactly is it? One set of philosophical positions, addressing the hard problem, views consciousness as a fundamental component of physical reality. For example an extreme view – “panpsychism” - is that consciousness is a quality of all matter: atoms and their subatomic components having elements of consciousness (e.g. Spinoza, 1677; Rensch, 1960). “Mentalists” such as Leibniz and Whitehead (e.g. 1929) contended that systems ordinarily considered to be physical are constructed in some sense from mental entities. Bertrand Russell (1954) described “neutral monism” in which a common underlying entity, neither physical nor mental, gave rise to both. Recently Stubenberg (1996) has claimed that qualia are that common entity. In monistic idealism, matter and mind arise from consciousness – the fundamental constituent of reality (e.g. Goswami, 1993). Wheeler (1990) has suggested that information is fundamental to the physics of the universe. From this, Chalmers (1995;1996) proposes a double-aspect theory in which information has both physical and experiential aspects.Among these positions, the philosophy of Alfred North Whitehead (1929; 1933) may be most directly applicable. Whitehead describes the ultimate concrete entities in the cosmos as being actual “occasions of experience,” each bearing a quality akin to “feeling.” Whitehead construes “experience” broadly – in a manner consistent with panpsychism – so that even “temporal events in the career of an electron have a kind of ‘protomentality’.” Whitehead’s view may be considered to differ from panpsychism, however, in that his discrete ‘occasions of experience’ can be taken to be related to “quantum events” (Shimony, 1993). In the standard descriptions of quantum mechanics, randomness occurs in the events described as quantum state reductions–these being events which appear to take place when a quantum-level process gets magnified to a macroscopic scale.As a final note in this section, the information about quantumphenomena and consciousness is presented here only to indicatethe reasonableness of adopting an indeterminacy model within autevolutiontheory. It is not necessary to identify the biological structureresponsible, but sufficient to show that reasonable alternativesexist that can be tested. My goal is to develop the most parsimoniousworldview and theory basis from the intersection of disciplinesinvolved. On this level I am reasoning on the preponderance ofevidence that indeterminism is at the very least, an importantscientific worldview and that corresponding theories may accountfor and be scientifically predictive of much that is observed.I conclude on this basis that it is reasonable and important toinvestigate the possible evolution of observership as well asits possible effects on evolution.
Return to menuConsistency with current theoriesAn important concern in producing the original paper was to workfrom existing paradigms, while at the same time arguing for theirexpansion or integration. This was to allow explanation of unfamiliarphenomena from established principles of nature. Only in referenceto existing concepts is it possible to demonstrate that new assumptionsare needed to resolve currently paradoxical explanations of phenomenasuch as system and organic self-organization, cooperation, thesimilarity between psychological processes and quantum processes,and apparent (though hotly debated) directionality and punctuatedstasis in evolution. As discussed in the paper, paradoxical explanationsare revealed when the full set of assumptions underlying a theoryare combined from various disciplines. Thus we may understandnew phenomena best in a context that is closest to prior modesof explanation, yet strives to combine the most successful viewsfrom all relevant disciplines. In other words, an entirely newbasis for explanation may be interesting, but will be extremelyunlikely to affect current scientific views or to develop correspondenceswith them. Accordingly, I believe we must look seriously at quantum-indeterminacyas a basic phenomena (a “real” construct) that mustbe extended to other disciplines, especially evolution and ecology.Regardless of the fact that quantum theory is not (or likely everwill be) complete for physicists, and that present thinking isexploring hidden dimensions and multiple “realities,”the most fundamental aspect of the theory from our perspective- indeterminacy – appears to be incontrovertible at thispoint, despite the most determined efforts to find other explanations.In our best scientific traditions, this constitutes solid groundsfor acceptance, and good reason to consider the implications beyondphysics. Anyone who does this in some depth is forced to concludeprofound changes in the way we view nature and necessarily evolution,since evolution is so fundamental to how we understand livingform. In this light, it is so unlikely that other disciplinescan remain unaffected by these discoveries in physics that itbecomes little more than stubbornness to retain classical assumptions,for example in biological theories of behavior and evolution.In a number of biological disciplines as well as psychology, correspondenceswith quantum phenomena are indicated and appropriate biologicalstructures for manifesting such phenomena have been predictedbased on current knowledge. We have in such cases, both correlationand “mechanism” (causal process), as well as the possibilityof resolving important paradoxes in current theory. This is sufficientjustification for pursuing theoretical development of these ideasin many fields.At the same time, as implied above, I do not see the value inanalogies with quantum phenomena that are not based on this firststep; that is, the implications of a macroscopic uncertainty principlefor living organisms and their evolution (i.e., the special theory).That is foundational to broader implications, as it implies amodification to deterministic theories and perhaps considerablestudy of what those modifications imply. While it may be interestingat this stage to speculate on further questions of organization,or about the consciousness of superorganisms such as Gaia, itis somewhat premature in terms of solid theory development. Thesepresumed implications may not be easily made relevant at presentin the context of building theory from an observational and experientialbasis, which science does. For example, many holistic ideas maybe compelling as metaphors for visualizing connectedness beyondspace-time reality due to the existence of higher dimensions (non-locality,in the jargon of physics), and the direct knowledge of God (inwhatever form) may indeed prove to be the most important humanexperience; but such entirely universal views of origins (ontology)may not lend themselves to comprehension in worldly terms (formalizationin predictive theory) — that is, within existing scientific worldviews.Even if we accept that all of reality originates from a singlecreative principle (and retains that principle in some way), ourmethodical construction of scientific theory is still more concernedwith describing the limitations placed on that reality (e.g.,the limits and effects of Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle,not the nature of the uncertainty itself) and hence the naturewe can observe and predict. We are, however, in an odd situationwhere having achieved some success at describing the limits toa perhaps unlimited potential (in quantum matter), and how thoselimits seem to define our world, we have subtly constructed theidea that the limitations themselves are reality. Thatis a terrible mistake, not at all required by science.If I seem bold in these assertions here, my goal in the paperis to ground them as much as possible and invite constructivecriticism so that we can decide as a scientific society if autevolution,especially in terms presented here, has a place in our understandingof nature.
Return to menuToward a special and general theory of autevolutionEcological vs. evolutionary GaiaI propose redefining the weak vs. strong Gaia taxonomy adoptedfor working purposes at the Chapman conference as “ecologicalGaia” vs. “evolutionary Gaia,” respectively inthis edition of the paper. I have also termed what I believe tobe the essential foundation for the stronger, evolutionary Gaiaconcepts as autevolution. This is to provide more generalapplication and to clarify the epistemological issues. I havefound very little historical use of this term (an attentive historianmay correct me on this), and thus, hopefully, it can be used toidentify the worldview and class of theories implied here, withfew historical connotations. It may share metaphorical similaritieswith other theories such as autogenesis, a discredited evolutiontheory that organisms can evolve themselves independently of interactionswith the environment (which is not what is proposed here), orvarious forms of vitalism that generally attempt to explain biologyand evolution in terms of creative manifestation. Autevolutioninstead attempts to incorporate plausible creative processes,based on sound theory, into biology and evolution in a way thatis consistent with know processes (i.e., the modern synthesis).I believe autevolution is significantly different from most ifnot all of these rejected views also because it can be formalizedon the basis of testable processes and offers new predictionsthat can be tested directly.In ecological terms, the idea that systems (including living organisms)can influence their own processes is not especially new, nor isit a problem epistemologically except when one explores fullythe presumed origins of such possibilities. If we ignore the issueof the origin of creativity, there are many references to self-influenceand creative behavior in the literature, not all intended metaphorically.But the idea that these same organisms can have influenced theirown evolution in completely innovative or creative ways is whatchallenges the current mechanical (or deterministic) worldviewof nature because it cannot avoid the issue of ultimate originand ultimate destiny (i.e., the problem of teleology). It is thisaspect that becomes either highly problematic within current theory,or revolutionary (discussed extensively in the paper). The distinctionbetween the more easily handled ecological view and the problematicevolutionary view helps emphasize the broader implications ofwhat is proposed and reflects the current epistemological paradoxthat keeps ecology and evolution disconnected (also discussedin the paper). I argue that the compelling issue of any Gaia theorydoes not reveal itself completely until we attempt to understandit in evolutionary terms.The separation between ecological and evolutionary views has beenpervasive in recent history, yet I believe also arbitrary andultimately undesirable. Since evolution is at the root of biologicalthinking, the problem of creative influence (which is at the rootof Gaia) must be dealt with in terms of evolution. Restrictionof scientific thought about self organization to weaker and morepalatable forms of Gaia, and thus primarily to ecological language,which has been generally favored in the literature, is thus anexpedient that avoids dealing with the important epistemologicalissues. The primary issue is that our basic model of evolution,and thus the main process by which present ecological interactionsdeveloped, is based on exclusively deterministic mechanisms (stochasticprocesses notwithstanding, as they are assumed to be deterministicallybased and thus evolutionarily neutral, even if important as anexplanation of certain kinds of variation). This view cannot considercreative (non-deterministic) influences as causal. Ecology, onthe other hand, embraces at least the language of creativity regardingorganisms (and occasionally communities or ecosystems), but itis always presumed that in some magical and unarticulated waycomplexity is producing apparently creative behavior (which isnevertheless assumed to be constructed from genetic, developmental,and environmental influences that vary from physical determinantsat most randomly). It follows that ecologists use the languageof creative influence merely for descriptive convenience. Yetthat magic attributed to complexity theory, a basic schizophreniathat allows ecologists to speak of evolution, and vice versa,is inadequately constructed and deserves questioning. At thisfundamental level the ecological form of biological systems theorycannot be merged with an evolutionary form unless both deal explicitlywith the problem of creative influence. Much of the paper dealswith laying the foundation for this, as well as laying a detailedfoundation for evaluating the modifications to our current worldviewin epistemological terms. I believe that this level of rigor isnecessary for such fundamental change to be considered.Autevolution: special vs. general theoryStated simply (and incompletely), the definitions I propose arethat the special theory of autevolution deals with theevolutionary implications for organisms of functional uncertaintyat the phenotypic level, and the general theory of autevolutiondeals with the further complexification of this phenomena withinmore inclusive systems (societies, ecosystems, and concepts ofGaia). I have avoided use of the recent term autopoiesisor its variations in this regard, because it is generally defineddeterministically and does not deal directly with the phenomenonof the ‘observer,’ which is nevertheless a central concept insome descriptions of autopoiesis. Autopoiesis means literally”self-making.” I define autevolution as “evolutionof the self and its reciprocal influence on evolution,” considering’self’ to be something treated by theory separately from structure.Autevolution needs only to imply “self-influencing,”recognizing the primary role of physical constraints, and theability for Darwinian processes to select for the quantum-correlatedstructure that allows self-influence, if it is adaptive. The “self”in this regard, then refers to the “observer” of quantumphysics, which has a true complimentarity relationship(through evolutionary time) with living form.The main idea I propose for autevolution is that the present modelfor biogenic environmental change (in ecological time) shouldinclude not only first-order deterministic processes (geneticexpression, development, ecology) but also second-order effectsfrom phenotypic decisions required by a fundamental indeterminismof organismic function (macroscopic indeterminacy that manifestsitself as functional decisions, or modifications of function otherwiseimplied imperfectly by form). These decisions and functional definitionsaffect selection through feedbacks between behavior and the environment.Such second-order (non-deterministic) effects, if admitted, wouldbe active in evolutionary time through environmental “registration”(expanding E. P. Odum’s concept of the total environmentto include information implied by organismic presence, behavior,and physical modifications organisms may make to the environment),the cumulative effect on natural selection, and thus the courseof evolutionary events (genetic variation and natural selection).This approach is discussed in the paper, and taken as the foundationfor the special form of autevolution.The point, then, is to discuss the evidence and possible processof non-deterministic influences on evolution that may come fromwithin the individual, not necessarily giving them primacy, butallowing them to be acted upon by natural selection – the mechanismfor inheritance being the information from previous generationsrecorded in the “total environment.” This model maymerge well with the new field of “memetics” where memesare thought forms that can be passed among perceptual beings,and which can presumably be recorded in and read from physicalstructures (or events) that have been influenced in some uniqueway by the meme. In the autevolution model, observership itselfmay be the original meme.In the autevolution view presented here, biological forms areonly partially “self-created,” using a psychologicaldefinition of self, although the effect may increase with complexity.This is not to say that the opposite view (that life is entirelycreative, with deterministic mechanism being a limiting or temporarycase) would not also be correct, taking into account all of evolutionarytime; but it is the former view that presents itself to us forstudy, in our common mode of perception.The separation into special and general theories follows traditions(Einstein’s special and general theories of relativity and Darwin’sOrigin of Species and Descent of Man) that help distinguish essentialfoundations from their less obvious implications, and thus lendsitself better to evaluation in stages. In this case, the specialtheory deals with the process of evolution of reproductive organismswhere the mechanical part of inheritance and selection is welldefined and probably dominant. The proposed basis of the specialtheory introduces an autevolutionary process at the organismiclevel, assuming that even minimally enhanced quantum coherenceis the basis for perception and functional indeterminacy. Thisis quite a step in itself because the basis for perception ishardly settled, and the implications of this view for all lifeare revolutionary in many fields. While I make reference, then,to implications for larger system co-determination (or co-influence),the process was not dealt with in the first paper at the systemlevel.The general theory applies to systems where, given the specialtheory, interspecific effects from self-determination are possibleat the system level. Extending the present ideas to ecosystems,Gaia, and perhaps the living universe, would logically be partof the general theory. An interesting (and more poetic) perspectivetoward the general theory dealing with possible non-local aspectsof observership (connected experiential states between organismsdue to superposition of the combined wave functions associatedwith consciousness in different individuals) was presented byDana Zohar in 1990, in The Quantum Self. In any case, phenomenadescribed in the general theory may be primarily dominated bynon-deterministic autevolution processes.Philosophical and metaphysical treatment vs. formalismI have not formulated these suggested theories beyond the hintsprovided here and in the paper: I have only discussed their philosophyand metaphysics. The practical demonstration and consequent fruitfulnessof these ideas has yet to be demonstrated (such formulationand fruitfulness being the important remaining epistemological criteriaidentified in the in the paper). Still, I believe the mathematicsof the proposed “special theory” as it affects neo-Darwinismwould be rather simple, and could be relatively easy to simulatein a computer model (perhaps some already exist). If this weredone, I would expect the simulation to confirm the punctuatedstability behavior diagrammed in Figure 1,and that rather bizarre evolutionary pathways (not explainablestrictly by the existing environment) could be produced by alteringfunctional definitions in the ancestral line. This would require,as a minimum, (a) representing functional definitions within theorganism, (b) linking behavior to perceived function, (c) associatingpresent structure as a constraint on functional definition, (d)providing for environmental modification (or selection) by theorganism, and (e) incorporating a means for future organisms (sameor different species) to extract accurate information from thepattern of environmental alteration (or simply the aspect of theenvironment that has been selected by ancestors).The origin of perceptionIn discussing causal process in the paper, I used the term “observer-participancy”or “observership” following the usage of John ArchibaldWheeler. In a brief scan of the literature, I noticed that thisis often being referred to as “the measurement problem”implying less confidence in describing the phenomenon, and perhapslittle progress in understanding it. “The measurement problem”is simply that perception (however defined) seems to be involvedin determining specific states of nature within certain realms(sub-atomic particles and, as I argue, living systems, with obviousanalogies in psychology), in apparent contradiction to the exclusiveway that more mechanical views of nature have been formulatedpreviously. The causal (or at least influential) part of thisprocess seems to rest with properties that are most often thoughtof as psychological or perceptual.This is certainly a revolutionary result, if maintained, and musthave implications for ecology, evolution, psychology, sociology,and other disciplines. Hence conservatism is warranted in itsapplication, but there is a very strong body of experience nowto indicate that the issue of some kind of transcendent realityas a primary cause for certain classes of natural phenomena willnot go away. This does not mean that every event, or even themajority, can best be explained from transcendent causes. Themajority of cause-effect relationships in our everyday observationof the time-space world seem clearly to be between classical spatialobjects interacting through time, not between objects extendinginto different reality dimensions (except for psychological phenomena);and most of these interactions are adequately described by mechanicaltheories. The discovery of macroscopic quantum behavior, consideredwithin our current understanding, says that some unpredictableprocesses may be caused, or at least influenced, from transcendentdimensions (relative to conventional four-dimensional space-time),within prescribable limits, through specific structures. If weadmit that there are observable phenomena associated with theapparently transcendent dimensions (as modern quantum physicsassumes), the role of science is still to determine the extentof such influences and their implications in our world, becauseit is our present-world observations and experience that scienceseeks to model. The search for transcendent dimensions and causesbecomes more metaphysics than physics, and its primary purposeis to produce a satisfying theoretical completeness (i.e., “theoryof everything”). Unless unequivocally demonstrated, the feasibilityof this goal remains highly questionable on the philosophicalgrounds that it may be logically impossible for any system tocontain a complete model (or theoretical understanding) of itsown origins. This means that while it may be ultimately inconclusiveto dwell on the full origins of observership, the effects of observershipcannot reasonably be left out of scientific theory in biologicaland other fields. It is simply a phenomenon we must deal withmore or less at face value, within our current stage of understanding.The origin of perception and consciousness (presumably going beyondmechanical stimulus-response models) also has potential explanationsin this view. First, however, we have to identify the problem.There is a popular view that chaos theory may hold an explanationfor free will and thus consciousness because it is successfulin describing some system-level aspects of unpredictable phenomena(such as weather, smoke plumes, etc.). However, there is a bigdifference between unpredictability and indeterminism as discussedin quantum physics. The former is a matter of human knowledgeand the practicality of carrying out complex calculations thattheoretically could produce arbitrary precision to any prediction.However, quantum uncertainty states that there is a fundamentallimit to such “knowability” and that even if the calculationscould be carried out infinitely, there would still remain a fundamentaluncertainty in the actual cause-effect relationships in nature.This difference is a metaphysical and epistemological issue aboutwhich there is considerable debate. For many philosophers, a classicalsystem, no matter how complex or chaotic, could not suddenly developnon-deterministic (i.e., truly creative) properties if such propertiesdid not exist at the most fundamental level. If, on the otherhand, perception is recognized as a property of all matter, withcorresponding complexity, its gradual elaboration through evolution,including the evolution of complex systems, would be quite inkeeping with our understanding of how biological functions evolve.The various abilities animals have to move are elaborations ofmore primitive movement mechanisms, biochemical processes areelaborations of more primitive chemistry, etc. What these functionscan specifically accomplish may emerge with complexity, but themarvel of nature is how they have evolved, not, as previouslythought, how they emerged spontaneously. Autevolution is thusa refutation of the idea that consciousness spontaneously emergedwith complexity, unless one is discussing a specific form of consciousness(e.g., human, ape, cetacean, etc.).
Return to menuQuantum reality and choice – is the “many worlds”interpretation reasonable?The attempt to explain quantum behavior deterministically hasled some physicists to think of multiple “realities”existing simultaneously, presumably in hidden dimensions. A populartheory, and a claimed resolution to the Cat Paradox,is the many worldsinterpretation of reality (e.g., Everett worlds).This theory seeks to remove the observer from any privileged rolein physics, thus striving for a fully mechanical (deterministic)worldview. Other “meta-theories” include many histories(similar to many worlds) and a “many minds” interpretation,which may be closest to Everett’s original concept. All of theseinterpretations involve hidden dimensions or entire hidden universes,and I believe they fail from the same kind of post-hoc cascadingcomplexity of explanations described earlier for all deterministicinterpretations. In this respect, deterministic theories may becircular, because they attempt to disprove the appearance of choiceas a creative act either by constructing explanations retrospectivelyand denying than any other course of events was possible (a singulardeterminism), or claiming that in fact all choices were made andexperienced simultaneously (a multiple determinism). The multipledeterminism view claims that apparent uncertainty in the classicalrealm is derived from an unlimited number of well-defined universes(thus providing the optional states that seem to exist in anygiven event). The approach thus remains just as unpredictive asthe non-deterministic view but adds the seemingly unnecessarydenial of one’s actual experience of choosing (which is obviouslyreported in the human case). Regardless of the current appealof finding a mechanical explanation for things, these approachesare not more logically parsimonious or of greater predictive valuethan the non-deterministic view, which attempts to explain phenomenain terms of observable conditions, within a statistically predictableuncertainty, and admits to a fundamental unknown involving thephenomenon of experience itself.It is a problem for many to adopt a non-deterministic world viewwhen observation, which seems inseparable from some form of vialism,also seems so intimately connected with deciding physical states,with causes and effects that transcend our known dimensions. Butdeterminism, as it must be laboriously constructed to accountfor quantum behavior, still does not eliminate the uncertaintyissue from the classical perspective or as it would apply to otherwiseclassical biological systems. Holding onto determinism in thesecontexts seems to be more a matter of tradition than scientificmethod or epistemology.David Bohem’sholism theory of “implicate order,” which bears greatestsimilarity to the interpretation conclude here (from differentorigins), provides for the primacy of our perceptual classicalworld as a stable reality (as far as we can tell, and as far asnecessary for the theory), but assumes undefined potential atthe quantum level.We would miss the point, however, to be overly concerned aboutwhich interpretation of quantum physics is correct, because allof them at this point confirm “the measurement problem”(quantum uncertainty, appearing from our perspective to be associatedwith the act of observing, hence requiring a definition of theobserver as a real entity), and “non-locality” (thetroubling but well documented result that certain related quantumevents require communication at greater than light speed, thusimplying connectedness in dimensions beyond known space-time reality).For biologists the choice is perhaps most dramatic, because theymust ultimately deal with the observer in biological form. Biologicalobservership (to the extent that the observer-experience phenomenonhas been magnified) must then hold an influential position inthe universe, not an accident or otherwise result of physicaland genetic determinism, as is most often described. This is aproblem for anyone wedded to anthropocentric interpretations,because it is not just human observership that is so implicated.Just as geocentricism eventually had to give way under the relentlesspressure of science, our cultural views of humans occupying aspecial place in creation have also consistently given way andmust continue to do so. It may be time to recognize philosophicallythat the most useful and parsimonious view of nature involveslife as a fundamentally creative, decision-making process, infusingour classical reality from outside traditional deterministic limits.This seem to occur through non-deterministic, macroscopic (orperhaps more properly, systemic) structures that are predictedby quantum theory. In addition to their confirmation in physicalexperiments, such structures are strongly implied in living organisms(particularly sensory organs and nerve cells). Precisely how creativedecision-making is explained may be essential its final acceptance,but it is perhaps less important at present than the current resultsthat indicate its existence and require that it be accounted forin all theoretical constructs where it is implicated. Physicists,philosophers, mystics, and theologians must deal with the possiblecauses of observership, but biologists, psychologists, and cyberneticists(or cyber-noeticists) must deal with the important implications.
Return to menuThe Cat ParadoxAnother recent experiment, by the same Boulder scientist involvedin producing Bose-Einstein condensates, demonstrated the simultaneousexistence of dual quantum states of a single particle. This resultis basically consistent with the Copenhagen interpretation ofquantum phenomenon but perhaps bringing it into closer agreementwith an idea that “observed” properties exist only aspart of the observing system. This latter view would seem to accountfor multiple eigenstates (i.e., “observed” states) existingsimultaneously. These reported results, and speculative interpretations,are compatible with the autevolution view I was describing, andsuggests to me a possible resolution to the famous Schrodinger’s”cat paradox.”The cat paradox is a thought problem based on the “delayedchoice” experiments and EPR paradox of quantum physics. Itwas proposed by Edwin Schrodinger to dramatize the apparent philosophicalproblem of observership. Briefly, if we accept that various experiments(EPR and delayed choice experiments) established that the actof observation affects not only the state of an observed particle,but also that of “non-local” particles that had previouslyinteracted with the observed particle, and that these states areapparently retroactive (in other words, once they are observed,we can deduce what state they logically were in at a prior time),the result seems paradoxical. First there seems to be difficultywith the apparent conclusion that that it is possible for anystate to be defined before some part of it is observed. One objectionto this is that the role of the observer in determining physicalstates becomes central. Furthermore, if historical states arealso dependent on such observation, it is unclear what state matteractually exists in prior to observation. This seems particularlyunacceptable if we include a living organism, say a cat, linkedto the observing system in such a way that the detected stateof a quantum particle determines if the cat lives or dies. Inthis case, the “measurement problem” implies that thecat is neither alive nor dead (Copenhagen interpretation) untilsomeone (defined how?) observes it, at which time the event appearsto have taken place at a prior time. Alternatives to this interpretationare that the cat is both alive and dead simultaneously (many worldsinterpretation) or that there are multiple realities in the observer(many minds interpretation).Hence, as the thought exercise goes, one must assume that theentire system, including the cat, is in an undetermined stateprior to (or independent of) observation, and this reasoning canbe extended to scientists observing the systems, and so on, neverarriving at a definitive observer. The problems raised are: (1)observership, (2) delayed choice, (3) non-locality, and (4) mixedor simultaneous states of matter (or, in alternative views, multiplesimultaneous realities or hidden dimensions).I believe there are a number of philosophical errors in the structureof this thought problem. First, it is framed around the idea thatthere is an implied difference between observers (presumably withconsciousness) and the observed (presumably without consciousness),and hence the problem of causality. Although observership is notnecessarily restricted to the human case, it is unclear whereit begins and ends, and thus what can qualify as an observer.The implication is actually that the entire observing apparatus(and the cat) exists in quantum uncertainty until the act of observation.Thus living organisms (presumably including humans) can in oneinstance be causal observers (with consciousness) and in anotherinstance objects (without consciousness) whose state is determinedby external observation. Hence, not only are we admitting to notbeing able to determine where consciousness exists, we are assumingby the way this thought problem is framed, that consciousnesscan exist or not exist for the same entity, depending on its rolein the experiment. A consistent approach to observership-experiencewould seem more reasonable.In fact, there is no basis for assuming that observership (andthus some form of consciousness) is restricted to humans, cats,or even living organisms. We have claims of consciousness onlyfrom human observers, but there is anecdotal evidence for non-humanspecies, and hard evidence of something akin to psychologicalphenomena from sub-atomic particles and Bose-Einstein condensates.We could just as easily (and incorrectly) assume that only physicistsare capable of observership, because to date only physicists haveobserved quantum states. Also, this problem is usually framedin a way that ignores a basic principle of quantum mechanics;that quantum phenomena are exhibited only in systems with lowquantum numbers, such as sub-atomic particles (or “wavicles”),or in correlated quantum matter that behaves like a single particle.Macroscopic systems (large quantum numbers) that are not speciallyconstructed to preserve quantum behavior exhibit classical phenomena.Thus the measurement problem seems to also be related to scale,and one could argue that the macroscopic classical system hasalready been observed (or “objectively reduced” in theterms used by Hammeroff and Penrose) byvirtue of its interrelationships. Also, due to continuing systeminteractions, it should remain in a state defined by that systemof interactions indefinitely.These two arguments lead to a possible resolution of the paradox.Once the observing apparatus is included in the experiment, thereis a mixture of classical and non-classical systems. Classicalsystems (high number of non-correlated quantum particles) do notexhibit quantum phenomena, hence the observing apparatus and thecat (which are macroscopically defined) are in a knowable statethroughout the experiment, and are responding to events in anentirely classical way (even though one may assume that theirsub-atomic makeup retains uncertainty). Instruments that are notconsciously observed can and do record seemingly random particleevents (regardless of how a record is defined). I thus concludethat all observed properties exist only as macroscopic phenomenain relation to other particles of a system. In effect, what weactually observe are relationships which appear to us as classicalobjects or events. The act of observing through some form of particleinteraction is in fact defining and participating in a systemof interacting particles, and the observed state is thus a systemproperty, that is, a property of systems with quantum numbersgreater than one, such as particle tracks, recording instruments,cats, people, etc. As we isolate particles experimentally, theninvolve them in different systems (observations) we infertheir non-system properties. The physical measurement cannot observea quantum object at all, which thus remains outside of our world,but it can involve it in a system interaction within which it’srole becomes defined as part of that system. The actual “observed”state is inseparable from its macroscopic and classical observingsystem because it is strictly a property of that system.At the most fundamental level it is thus likely that fixed statesof matter and energy do not exist at all except as a set of potentialrelationships, and that classical properties are emergent onlyin relation to system properties. It is perhaps the act of particleinteraction (perhaps appearing like “self-collapse”of the quantum wave function, as proposed by Hammeroff and Penrose)that in essence “observes” the state, and every particleitself is an observer, albeit a rather unsophisticated one. Thisalso implies that every particle is, in some strange sense, alive.If physicists perform experiments on a particle in isolation,they infer its quantum behavior from the randomly normal distributionof results, but if they observe many interacting particles (asin a macroscopic object), they see more defined (limited) emergentsystem properties, exhibiting classical phenomena as the numberof particles included in the system increases. The individual(classical) states of the system’s particles are thus definedby their interactions, and do not exist in isolation. Hence, eachparticle carries with it the ability to interact with and thusco-define the state of other particles as an emergent system property,and they do so whether or not a researcher is present. Any macroscopicobject, has in essence, observed itself through its own systeminteractions. If, however, a researcher is a part of this system,as we are a part of the space-time world, then he or she mustobserve the classical properties of that system. The EPR and delayedchoice experiments did not involve macroscopic quantum uncertainty,which the cat paradox incorrectly assumes for the observing apparatus.In fact, such macroscopic quantum behavior has been observed onlyin highly specialized systems, such as a Bose-Einstein condensate,which is constructed of quantum correlated matter (many particlesacting as one).These ideas come closest to the thoughts of David Bohem.For example, compare the ideas above with a quote from Bohem’s1951 book, Quantum Theory (reprinted in 1989 by Dover):“For as we have seen, the quantum properties of matter are to be associated with incompletely defined potentialities, which can be more definitely realized only in interaction with a classically describable system (a special case of which is a measuring apparatus)” Bohm, 1951The resolution of this thought problem may be seen in this viewpoint:that if one did construct the diabolical apparatus to kill a catwhen a particle decay is detected, then the apparatus itself wouldbe involving the particle in its classical reality, which woulddecay at a specific (though unpredictable) time in the referencesystem of the observing apparatus and trigger the fatal mechanism.If, independently of this apparatus, one were to measure the quantumstate of the particle (isolated experimentally), it would exhibitthe individual quantum uncertainty properties (and emergent classicalproperties upon observation) appropriate to that observing system.This means that there is an objective reality (from our perspective),but that it exists only as an emergent property of macroscopicsystems that are quantum uncorrelated and it is relative to thosedefining (or observing) systems. The entire macroscopic universemay be thought of as the observing system that presently definesour experiential and classical space-time reality, and thus ensuresconsistency of that experience. The fundamental (undefined) natureof our world is observed only by isolating parts of it under carefullycontrolled conditions – laboratory experiments and certain naturalstructures. Quantum correlated systems (single particles, Bose-Einsteincondensates, and perhaps the perceptual apparatus of living organisms)retain the indeterminism of the underlying quantum reality, andthus exhibit observership phenomena. This then, may also be theessence of life (as experience), its rudiments existing in sub-atomicmatter.This perspective also says something about the nature of observership.The Copenhagen interpretation adopted a model where there is anapparent “collapse” of the quantum wave function onobservation, but this may be only the way it appears to a classicalobserver. The “object” before observation may not reallybe changing state at all, so much as it is manifesting a classicalrole as an emergent system property by participating in a systeminteraction. The nature of the isolated “wavicle” remainsquantum mechanical (as can be inferred from observation in referenceto other macroscopic observing systems, within an experimentaldesign that is constructed to emphasize system independence),yet by causing the wavicle to interact with and join a given system,we evoke macroscopic system properties that can be precisely noted.If classical system properties emerge in any system interaction,can we not assume that all matter is capable of observership?An uncomfortable aspect of this view is the question of how particlescan retain non-local relationships to other particles (in theory,all other particles), and yet be involved in apparentlyisolated observations under laboratory conditions. Again, however,the state of the given particle may not really be changing, butmay instead be relative to the system (observation) that it isa part of – which is defined by the experimental design. The resultthat it may exhibit different emergent properties in relationshipto different systems (when carefully designed to emphasize theirobservational independence, or sufficient separation in time)simply reinforces the conclusion that the actual sub-atomic stateremains as unrestricted potential. Its apparent collapse, whichendures for a predictable time and is stable under presumablyindependent observation, is a sort of hysteresis in the classicalrealm – a memory of the classical role that was evoked by theobservation, lasting for the time required for that highly simplifiedsystem to be “forgotten.” Is it possible that in additionto a basis for consciousness, this indicates a rudimentary basisfor some aspect of memory? As a possible test of this view, onemight ask if two independent systems could be created that wouldobserve different properties at the same time from the same quantumobject. This would show that the quantum object itself retainsits undefined potential, but that the echo or memory of its stateis a system-dependent property. The recent laboratory demonstrationof dual simultaneous states of a single ion, may confirm thisresult, as the cleaver system arrangement used to produce thisdual state may in effect be thought of as such a split systemmaking dual simultaneous but independent observations, and thusmanifesting dual emergent properties of the same undefined quantumobject.In other words, rather than the particle changing state on observation(as assumed in the Copenhagen Interpretation), it is the observingsystem that becomes defined along with apparent non-local correlationsconsistent with the defining observations. This differs dramaticallyfrom the “many worlds” view (discussedelsewhere) in that here, multiple worlds exist only as isolatedand limited circumstances within our observable classical world,as defined by specialized observing systems.The prediction, then, is that Schrodinger’s cat will have a normallife without the least bit of confusion as to if it is alive ordead (but some confusion about its purpose, if autevolution iscorrect), but that if it does yet die from some raving physicist’sexperiment, it will do so at a precise time and could just aswell be alone as under observation. Meanwhile, however, Schrodinger’scat has observed a lot of physicists, who’s observed states arenow irrevocably intertwined with one cat’s state of mind, andif it does live, we may wish to correct any misconceptions itmay have about our motives.
Return to menuWhy must “autevolution” be consistent with existingmodels?To argue for the a methodical (and to some, slower) developmentis to claim that understanding can be reached from virtually anydirection, given the appropriate developments, but that it isgenerally best to start from where we are. This involves the greatestnumber of people and utilizes the foundations already provided,at great prior effort. My basic conclusion about strong Gaia,as identified in the conference, and hence autevolution as identifiedin this edition of the paper, is that if formulated on the basisof holism (as Lovelock originally described it) it may remainmetaphorical and phenomenalistic, and thus easily ignored by manybranches of science. However, if formulated on the basis of aslight modification to present theory – the recognition of a confirmedprocess and the mapping of the effects of that process in variousdisciplines – then advances will be more tangible and compelling.They may also have more practical application in science becausecorrespondences can be more easily established with theories ofknown predictive value.
Return to menuIs autevolution reductionistic?An anticipated criticism of this work from the more popularlyprogressive side, is that it suffers from being “reductionistic,”that is, it proposes to explain life in terms of physical principles,which some people fear will devalue or trivialize the mysteriesof human experience (e.g., art, love, mystical experience, etc.).The opposite criticism, from traditional scientific views, isthat it is not reductionistic, but vitalistic.These criticisms tell us more about problems with categorizationin the English language (philosophy’s shifting definitions) thanany important distinction, for neither of these categories fit.Perhaps it is because of my early training in physics that I donot see reductionism as a problem. Consider that in this casereductionism means reducing explanations to a fundamental uncertaintythat has led scientists to seriously consider ontic limits tothe knowable universe, and perhaps a “real” universethat extends beyond classical dimensions. With this hardly limiting”reduction” to beyond the dimensions of our knowablereality, I am confident that there will remain ample room forthe mysteries of life. Meanwhile, reduction to familiar concepts,even ones we don’t fully understand, should hardly be considereda flaw. Its purpose is to help organize and compare our understandingof our experiences.
Return to menuIs autevolution vitalistic?Autevolution incorporates a indeterminate and seemingly vitalisticelement (creative awareness) into current deterministic models(as does quantum theory), accepting their confirmed mechanicalprocesses. The anticipated criticism that autevolution is “pre-scientificvitalism” or returns to mystical concepts of autogenesis(form created entirely from within), would be incorrect in oneimportant regard, that autevolution, as described here, is fullyconsistent with classical theory. True vitalism and autogenisiswould be inconsistent with current views because they are basedentirely on vital assumptions that are alternatives tomore successful models for observed phenomena. Returning to historicalviews might indeed ignore the hard won conclusions of classicaland quantum physics, as well as other disciplines, and those conclusionswould have to be reached again from a different starting pointwith perhaps equal if not greater effort. Still, the result wouldcertainly be the same. Scientists have identified and adequatelyexplained many apparently mechanical processes, and along theway have discovered the limits to this apparently mechanical nature.It is outside established limits to mechanical explanation thatseemingly vital causes appear — they do not appear as an entirelyalternative explanation. Quantifying indeterminism within a basicallymechanical worldview is not a vitalist worldview because it isformulated as an observable limit to deterministic processes,i.e., within an otherwise classical worldview. It would be morecorrect to refer to autevolution as representative of an organicworldview, as described by Abram (1991).Non-deterministic cause, where they are inescapable, can be presentedin carefully prescribed forms (e.g., “the uncertainty principle”),the effects of which can be confirmed empirically. Vitalism, onthe other hand, would attempt to see everything as original creationon a moment to moment basis, thus ignoring the common perceptionof time, space, and the corresponding processes we observe. Note,however, that a completely timeless perspective is not necessarilywrong (it also appears as a singularity in theories of cosmologicalorigins), but it is not a view that entirely presents itself tous in our normal perceptual mode.
Return to menuWhat is art?As a related comment on the source and role of art, a concernin evaluating the proposed creative origins within an inclusiveworldview; there would seem to be ample opening for artistic originsand considerable effect of artistic expression. In fact the theorymight suggest that there is considerably more room for such expressionthan is commonly perceived. First, one can argue that all artembodies uncertainty of some kind, which is one element that makesit interesting. Art poses questions for the beholder or listenermore than it gives answers, and it seems that the best art raisesthe unanswerable questions, or the deepest experiences, to a highlevel of contemplation. In the evolutionary view proposed here,the emergence of art, and its creative content, is not as surprisingas it might be with purely mechanical theories. Such artisticuncertainty and questioning is equivalent in concept to the ideaof fundamental uncertainty (through observer-participancy) andself-determined function. These are, in the view presented here,the underlying cause of purposeful evolutionary directions (ofform and ideas) about which much art is concerned. In the deterministicview, any system that would evolve an elaborate role for art wouldmost logically have a practical use for it (otherwise why wouldnatural selection have favored it?). Whereas, in the view presentedhere, its significant emergence would be expected even if onlyas an expression of one’s own basic nature and creative origin.This may result from an increasing self-awareness (which mustthen include an increasing awareness of uncertainty). It is thusnot surprising that other complex organisms, such as the greatapes, also exhibit interest in artistic expression. Such expressions,rather than being the result of evolution would instead be moresignificant as a cause of future evolutionary directions.The fact that parallels can be drawn with human experience, suchas art, should be seen as strengthening to the basic worldviewbecause it suggests a more parsimonious unity within the sciencesas well as between science and other forms of living experienceor expression. Furthermore, an established worldview where artand science embrace each other more fully would have tremendoussocial value, a factor given some importance in science by philosopherssuch as Kuhn, in his analysis of scientific revolutions.
Please cite as: Kineman, John Jay. 1997. “Toward a special
and general theory of autevolution.” Boulder: Bear Mountain
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