Kineman, J. 1997. Theory of Autevolution
Historical concepts
Ideas of interconnectedness and harmony in nature has existed
since early recorded times (Visvader, 1991).
Such ideas are represented today in the concept of Gaia (Abram, 1985
and 1991). Like the historical
views, many modern notions of Gaia have been only metaphorically
or phenomenalistically defined, and are therefore difficult to
analyze scientifically (Kirchner, 1991).
Yet some of the difficulty may also stem from narrow interpretations
of the nature of science and overly simplistic assumptions in
biological theory (Goldsmith, 1990).
This situation has motivated intense debate but few attempts to
integrate differing theoretical perspectives that are inseparably
linked to our basic view of life.
The Chapman conference
Two forms of James Lovelock’s “Gaia hypothesis” were
identified during the Chapman conference. These were termed weak
Gaia and strong Gaia, at the conference referring to
the degree of supposed influence of biota on the environment,
at microscopic to global levels. The degree of influence that
has been variously proposed has included, on the one hand, the
influential, stabilizing, and coevolutionary taxonomies proposed
by Kirchner (1991); and
on the other hand, various superorganism concepts, which include
teleological or even conscious control on the part of the biota
as a whole. For greater generality and greater clarity with regard
to the epistemological issues that may be called into question,
I suggest replacing the “weak Gaia” vs. “strong
Gaia” nomenclature of the original Chapman conference with
the labels “ecological Gaia” and “evolutionary
Gaia” respectively. This reflects what I believe is an important
philosophical split within the biological sciences.
Ecological and evolutionary Gaia
I define ecological Gaia as a class of theories that attempt to
explain global and interactive systems phenomena in terms of present
ecological concepts (including cooperation and control theory).
It is thus bound by current theoretical structures including adaptation
and mechanistic evolution, and
is confined to current scientific assumptions and definitions
of life. The main epistemological concern for this class of hypotheses
is testability within established scientific disciplines and within
the traditional empirical methods of science. Ecological Gaia
theories would thus be judged in regard to how well they conform
to observations within current paradigms and concepts of science.
Examples in this category might be the hypothesis that land cover
tends to have a regulating effect on global climate (e.g. Lovelock’s
“Daisyworld” model), or that atmospheric compositions
have co-evolved with life. Certainly, the initial steps toward
a “science of the Earth” are beginning in this manner
(e.g. Rambler, et al., 1989).
However, implied (or stated) in the Gaia views that have emerged,
there is a pervasive concept that is not part of the way traditional
science has been formalized, or the way traditional biology has
been formalized; one in which life itself is seen as a causal
agent both in ecology and evolution (see Lovelock, 1979,
1988; Margulis and Lovelock, 1989;
Jantsch, 1980; Plotkin, 1988;
Wheeler, 1981; Wigner, 1981;
Bohr, 1958, 1961,
1963; Odling-Smee, 1988).
The stronger form of Gaia, or “evolutionary Gaia” refers
to such interpretations of Gaia that require modification to existing
theoretical assumptions about nature, necessarily involving the
modern “synthetic theory” of evolution (and perhaps
challenges some limited ideas about science). For example, a literal
concept of a superorganism would probably fall into this category
because it violates traditional ways of defining life in reproductive
terms and suggests consciousness at a system level. A strictly
theological approach to Gaia may also fall into this category,
but is not considered here because it rejects science as a method
of discovery. Thus, it is not the degree of biotic influence or
specific phenomena that distinguishes a stronger, evolutionary
Gaia theory from more acceptable ecological treatments, but rather
the kind and origin of influence that is assumed.
Autevolution
Accepting this distinction between the two forms of Gaia, the
focus of this paper is on possibilities within the second category,
that is, on epistemologically acceptable interpretations of evolutionary
Gaia that may nevertheless challenge current theoretical assumptions.
I argue that this class of Gaia theory represents a worldview
that deals with life as a causally effective creative process,
both in ecology and evolution, that is, where organisms are seen
as participating in their evolution. In this paper I describe
such an evolutionary basis for Gaia, which I call autevolution
(literally, “self evolution,” meaning evolution of the
“self” and the role of the “self” in evolution).
No complete theory of autevolution or evolutionary Gaia currently
exists in scientific terms, nor do I pretend to completely develop
one here (although a number of serious efforts are evidently being
developed). However, I do try to uncover a common root for a suitable
theory in terms of fundamental principles. This necessarily exposes
critical epistemological issues for which we must establish guidelines
for evaluation. After a brief background discussion, I address
the problem in three stages. First, I propose a scientific definition
of autevolution as an evolutionary worldview involving complementarity
between self-defined function and evolutionary form. Second, I
develop an epistemological model that shows how various philosophies
of science can be integrated to provide a means by which new theoretical
approaches (such as implied in autevolution) can be evaluated.
This is necessary to bridge current epistemological boundaries
between ecology, evolution, and physics. Finally, I discuss some
likely implications of autevolution, in terms of epistemology,
and the relationship between the implied worldview and more traditional
theories including the mechanistic theory of evolution.
Reprinted from: Kineman, John Jay. 1991. “Gaia: Hypothesis
or worldview?” Chapter 7 In: Schneider, S. H., and P. J.
Boston (eds). 1991. Scientists on Gaia. Papers delivered
at the American Geophysical Union’s annual Chapman Conference
in March, 1988. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 433p.
Please cite as: Kineman, John Jay. 1997. “Toward a special
and general theory of autevolution.” Boulder: Bear Mountain
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