John,Whew! I will respond to the first two paragraphs now and will have to consider the rest later.
Perhaps this first response will make further interchange unnecessary.
I do not disagree with relational framework as you represent it. However, a difference in our views is rooted in “It would also have a law-like process associated with its temporal behavior.” I make a distinction between having a process and executing a process. In my mental model this is similar to potential energy vs. kinetic energy.
In my view a system exists when and while a configuration is responding to a stimulus then reverts to a configuration (which may be, usually is, different from before).
I do not claim that this is a popular perspective, only that I have found it quite useful in sorting out many misunderstandings among practitioners. A configuration can reflect all 4 or 5 aspects. It just doesn’t laugh until tickled.
OBTW, like us it can’t tickle itself.
Make sense?

On Dec 16, 2014, at 5:01 PM, John Jay Kineman <John.Kineman> wrote:

Jack,

I’d be interested in this distinction between a system and a configuration of end items.
In the relational framework, there are four archetypal ways of pointing to something systemic; four kinds or aspects to reality. These are never separate, except that we can see their separate aspects. But one of them could not exist without the other three – it is a natural unit that when seen or interacted interacts or gets seen in one of these four ways depending on how we approach it. So, if I ask about something we’ll label as X, X would have a measurable, material aspect to it. It would also have a law-like process associated with its temporal behavior. It would also have a certain design, parameters, or shape to its associated laws, and it would have some precedent structure that acquired a role in a larger system that, in a sense, gave it meaning and specification as X4 (the whole of X). Additionally, it would have a 5th aspect which is some transcendent quality associated with the whole – identity or ‘self’ primitive as those might be.

That’s the holon philosophy. If we decide to think that way, even for experimental purposes, then a “configuration of end items” would be its material aspect, whereas a “system” would imply all 4 or 5 aspects. But, in theory, there can’t be one without all, although we may have to look pretty far throughout nature to find them all (the theory does not say they need to be co-located or bound together by a skin as organisms are, just that they theoretically exist in nature, otherwise none of the aspects could exist).

So, perhaps by explaining it this way I can get across the idea that there is a way of looking at and for ‘whole’ systems, and yet we will commonly see fractions of systems. Also, the supposedly ‘whole’ entailments are not absolute or unique. If there were only one set of 4 aspects for a given occurrence, it would be completely isolated from everything else. We could not know of it. The 4 aspects are causalities, i.e., ways of knowing or interacting in nature. So, to be interactive (or known) it must have entailments with other such whole systems. It then meets Arthur Koestler’s concept of holon, which is both part and whole at the same time. It has a holistic property – the identity holon that labels it as a unique system – and also interactive properties that link it to other systems to form larger and smaller systems.

In practice, the idea is not so strange as it might sound. We identify a natural object by its measurable properties and by what we can infer about its laws of origin and behavior. That’s at least half of the holon, and sometimes 3/4ths if we get into system-dependent laws. The critical missing element is the 4th quadrant – final cause – which has had so much misunderstanding since 1000BC that most scientists have discarded it and won’t think about it. But even in its rather anthropomorphic label as “purpose” we know we can’t really get rid of it, certainly not in soft systems. Hard systems are essentially defined by getting rid of it. In doing that, what we are really doing is separating the origin of a system from its operation and working only with its operation (also associated with the idea of ‘configuration’). We are no longer working with its deeper “organization” (as Rosen emphasized), which would involve its origin and system identity. In fact, for all mechanistic systems we pushed that origin and organization back to the big bang to get rid of it in ‘practical’ science. Since then, so the story goes, it has only been a matter of ‘reconfiguration’ and thus we can look for a single set of natural laws that describe reconfiguration of already created objects or energies. Not surprisingly, as we calculate such reconfiguration, which uses energy, we calculate that such a system must run down and eventually be exhausted. Obviously that is the case if we have eliminated all possibility of new origins.

Then we have quite a bit of difficulty when it comes to living and cognitive systems because it is hard to talk about them without referring to some kind of origin. Origin of species, new ideas, etc. These are origin problems and traditional science eliminated origin problems, so there is tremendous controversy about vitalism and the like being un-scientific, or at least there has been. But what could be more obvious than the fact that we can’t talk about origins in science if we define science only as reconfiguration after everything has originated? So that is the root of our confusion.

Formal and final cause put origin back into science, but how to do it without making it all arbitrary? To put it back together we have to un-do a huge mistake that was made in 1000BC. That mistake led to a tremendous era of material discovery and understanding, but it blinded us to origins. It was to imagine causality as a hierarchy from an infinite unknowable creator down to precisely knowable matter and energy. In earlier times, the scientific world view was not hierarchical like that, it was cyclical. The creator was nature itself. Final cause stems from material existence. It is the meaning of a material existence with regard to some larger system (context). That is also the ancient idea of karma. The past shapes the purpose and direction of the future. It may seem like an anthropomorphic view because we are most familiar with that kind of think in human affairs. However, what if humans evolved from nature and now reflect its already established fundamental properties? Then it may not be so wrong to associate at least very deep principles we can learn from humanity, with properties of nature. Where else did they come from?

On that level, as I’ve described it so far, the relational view might be taken as the ultimate atheism. Whereas the Western view pushed God out of nature and before the big bang, this idea seems to eliminate the concept altogether and replace it with nested whole natural systems. But it is actually not atheism, because the infinity still exists; it is just brought into the natural system instead of being pushed out of it. It is actually more compatible with modern contemplative religious thought. But like the hierarchical idea it is still possible to do science short of running into the infinities. In old science we could look at mechanisms without running into infinities. We could not look at consciousness or life without encountering them. In the relational view we can look at life and consciousness without running into the infinite regress of larger and smaller systems. They are still there, implicitly, but the method of whole analysis allows us to construct proximal relations and leave the infinities as more remote effects. So it expands science.

Sorry for such an involved explanation of the holon view in answer to a simple question, but it seems unproductive to keep saying what relational theory says about various things without saying why it says it and giving the view that is required for understanding it. If relational theory is viewed from a traditional mechanistic world view, it can only appear to be mystical and untestable, because it refers to causes that are outside the mechanistic world view — those are the contextual causes (final-formal entailments that comprise the contextual aspect) and (functor encoding/decoding) relations between context and realization. The relations between context and realization are strictly informational in nature – they are not causal relations at all. The relation between a blueprint and the actions involved in construction is not causal, it is informational and acts as a constraint on those dynamics. The same is true, I would think, of a catalyst. It provides the general conditions in which a completely separate process can occur. It does not cause the process to occur, but enables and allows it to occur. The process may not occur with the catalyst (if the process isn’t right), and the process could occur without the catalyst, which only makes the process more likely. That’s typical of an information relation. Its like knowing there is a sale on at the grocery store does not cause you to go there and buy the sale items, but it can act as a catalyst to increase the likelihood that you will.

Now, I’m no chemist, but I can imagine there are many reactions that are pretty darn certain given the catalyst – they don’t seem to have the uncertainty I indicated above. That does not violate the theory. Information relations can become reduced by a lot of environmental constraints and can begin to act mechanically. A complex system can mimic a mechanism. In that case, the tendency is to write the equations for the catalyst together with the equations for the process being catalyzed, treating them both as part of the same set of natural laws. Its an approximation, but we still call it a catalyst because it is a clearly defined different ingredient that doesn’t directly produce the result but allows it to happen. But when we translate the concept into the living and cognitive domain, we clearly introduce contextual differenes. Even in standard definitions of catalyst list one for chemistry and another for society “a person or thing that precipitates an event”. Obviously, a good comedian can precipitate a lot of fun and laughter, but not necessarily. He/she doesn’t cause the fun and laughter, it is caused within each participant if they are in the mood for that kind of environment. Obviously with chemistry and lower organisms some ‘moods’ are pretty darn reliable, so it seems to be a mechanical connection in those cases.

So, if that helps somewhat and doesn’t serve to just make the relational idea seem even more remote, then perhaps the answer to this question about catalyst being a system or material can be easily answered with the word “yes”. As a catalytic system it would certainly have a material aspect. But it is not the material aspect that is directly associated with the catalytic effect; it is the context of that material aspect that is influencing the process. Example: lets take snow. Snow does not cause skiing. But the contextual aspect of a snowy, hilly environment enables it, induces it, if people want to ski. Its even a necessary environment. But a mechanical analysis would simply write an equation for the amount of snow that correlates with the amount of skiing, as if one caused the other. Then, to be honest, we would have to add an uncertainty factor.

Yours,
John

Dr. John J. Kineman
Senior Research Scientist
University of Colorado
Boulder, Colorado
john.kineman
(Ph) 303-443-7544: (M) 303-586-4969

On Dec 16, 2014, at 7:22 AM, Jack Ring <jring7> wrote:

Ken, Can you please describe an example? It may elucidate catalyst or question the whether it is in fact a system as contrasted to a configuration of end items.
Jack
On Dec 15, 2014, at 7:52 PM, Ken Lloyd <kalloyd> wrote:

Jack,

We have some examples where the morphism between the system and its context(s) morphs, leaving both the system and contexts unchanged. This in some sense affects the behavior and evolution of the system. Perhaps this is what the conversation means by the term “catalyst”. But, my interpretation is far from certain.

Ken

From: Jack Ring [mailto:jring7]
Sent: Monday, December 15, 2014 5:47 PM
To: John Jay Kineman
Cc: Steve Wallis, PhD; Len Troncale; Gary Langford; Josh Sparber; Richard Martin; William Schindel; Duane Hybertson; Gary Smith; James Martin; Tom Marzolf; David Rousseau; Richard Emerson; Kristin Giammarco; Kent Palmer; Luke Friendshuh; Janet Singer; Michael Singer; Harold; Lynn Rasmussen; David Ing; Jennifer Wilby; Ken Lloyd
Subject: Re: Criteria for A GST2

When a system acts on its context then the context morphs. Further, the action can result in the system morphing too. However, a catalyst is not affected by its participation in any interaction, never morphs. Rather like a field than an object. Perhaps a catalyst influences existence but not regulates it per se.
Am I misinterpreting your response?

On Dec 15, 2014, at 5:27 PM, John Jay Kineman <John.Kineman> wrote:

Hi Jack,

You asked how R-theory would treat the notion of a catalyst. Here’s what occurs to me.

The short answer is that a catalyst is formal cause. It is one system providing a context for the existence or regulation of another system. It thus corresponds with quadrant 3 in the holon diagram, the expression (decoding) of a model. Every natural system has formal cause and thus the equivalent of a catalyst – it is the aspect of contextual system that allows the material system to exist, or limits or regulates its existence. It can be a rate regulation, but if you take that to the limits it is on a continuum between existence (maximum rate of occurrence) and non-existence (zero rate of occurrence), and is thus a similar causal type to the origin or creation of a system. Is it fair to say that a catalyst regulates existence? This gives a definition that is general to both hard and soft fields.

I am writing more on this, but will finish it later….

John

On Dec 15, 2014, at 8:21 AM, Jack Ring <jring7> wrote:

John,

Apologies if you have already done so and I missed it but with regard to the framework could you please address the notion of a catalyst?

Jack

From: John Jay Kineman [mailto:john.kineman]
Sent: Friday, September 19, 2014 3:00 PM
To: Steve Wallis, PhD
Cc: Ken Lloyd; Lenard Troncale; Gary Langford; Jack Ring; Josh Sparber; Richard Martin; Bill Schindel; Duane Hybertson; Gary Smith; James Martin; Tom Marzolf;david.rousseau; Richard Emerson; Kristin Giammarco; Kent Palmer; Luke Friendshuh; Janet Singer; Michael Singer; Harold; Lynn Rasmussen; David Ing; Jennifer Wilby
Subject: Re: Criteria for A GST2

Hi Steve,

I also rebel somewhat at rigid labeling of theory, model, schema, etc.; although I suppose they have value in relative terms. So lately I’ve been discussing ‘frameworks’ for sustainability science. A common Socio-ecological integral framework is the DPSIR ‘schema'(?) Driver-Pressure-State-Impact-Response. I’ve mapped that into a more standard four quadrant causality which seems to be much more fundamental and ubiquitous. But its problematic even to call it a ‘causality’ as narrower definitions of cause limit that to mechanical/material causes that, indeed, enforce rules like A and B can’t simultaneously cause each other; whereas in fact in nature we know they can.

The resolution is certainly going to additional causes that allow it to happen in a complex system (this is fundamental in Rosen’s theory for example), but that gets up the fir for traditional scientists who don’t want to go ‘soft’. The distinction between a ‘simple’ system in which A and B cannot be mutually causal (relates to the definition of a mechanism) and a ‘complex’ system in which they can be is crucial in my view. We could even say that complex systems are most fundamentally characterized by loop causalities (which then explains the other commonly observed properties of non-linearity, surprise, resilience, emergence, informatics, etc.).

Being semi-retired and basically cantankerous I just ignore all the traditional nail biting and say there are four kinds of causation in nature; get over it. But of course that doesn’t work for everyone, and there’s so little good work developing it that I really can’t expect it to be at all ‘standard’ thinking as much as I would like it to be (its currently expanding quite a bit though). Even in my class I was very reluctant to teach it until by nibbling around the edges via other ‘frameworks’, including PAR, I found it unavoidable. Perhaps that’s just the inevitability of my own beliefs emerging when forced to be honest, but so far its working and I’m finding it to be very teachable; without which we would be struggling for a focus in a survey of many different kinds of socio-ecological system.

I need to know more about what Len and this group have been doing. I am certainly derelict in not having done so earlier, but the exigencies of time and wading through one’s own swamp have their say.

Meanwhile, I found this Japanese work to be quite amazingly similar, even down to use of the 4-quad model, schema, theory, framework, world-view, meta-model or whatever it is. It works. They took their model from Ken Wilber (another Boulder resident I might add). From what I’ve done I think we can put much more rigor into Wilber’s model. He developed it, like Aristotle, as a way of classifying causal aspects of reality, but neither have been explicit about its loop causality. Aristotle framed it as a hierarchy, which most of the Western world adopted, with the result of requiring that a line be drawn at some level in the hierarchy to distinguish what was in the world of science and knowledge and what was transcendent and unreachable. When properly entailed as a closed cycle of causation, however, those problems go away. The transcendence is then in the 5th cause – the loop itself; why nature invented loop causality and self-emergence. Even the Veda does not consider that knowable other than some urge to exist.

Fortunately, and I think rather surprisingly, these authors chose to make their entire book free in digital form. I highly recommend taking a look or a scan. Perhaps some will already know of it and have some comment. Here’s the link http://link.springer.com/book/10.1007%2F978-4-431-54340-4

I would also append the book itself but it is over 4MB so it might not make it through some email filters.

Cheers,
John

No virus found in this message.
Checked by AVG – www.avg.com
Version: 2015.0.5577 / Virus Database: 4253/8741 – Release Date: 12/15/14